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WILLIAM D. MALLARD, JR.*

Nuremberg- A Step Forward?t
"In pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8th day of August, 1945,
by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional
Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there shall be established an International Military Tribunal ...for the just and prompt trial and punish-

ment of the major war criminals of the European Axis... "I
So begins Article 1 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
1945, which represented a new step forward in international law, or raised
the curtain for a kangeroo court of major proportions, depending on your
point of view. And there were and are varying and dramatically opposed
viewpoints on the necessity and legality of the trials at Nuremberg which
took place under the Charter.
At Nuremberg there unfolded a drama never before seen: the leaders of
a defeated nation were indicted for violation of international law and put on
2
trial by their conquerors. The indictment consisted of four counts.
1) Conspiracy to commit the crimes set out in the next three counts.
2) Crimes Against Peace - planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression or a war in violation of international agreements.
3) War Crimes - violation of the laws or customs of war (in this count
the indictment set out several examples of such violations including
murder or ill treatment of civilian population, murder or ill treatment
of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, and killing of hostages).
4) Crimes Against Humanity - murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population before or during the war or prosecution on political, social or
*Safety Engineer, Southern Research Institute, Birmingham, Alabama; student, Cumberland School of Law, Sanford University, Birmingham, Alabama; member, Law Student
Division, American Bar Association, and Phi Delta Phi International Legal Fraternity;
Comments Editor, Cumberland-Sanford Law Revised.
tThis paper received Honorable Mention in the 1969 Henry C. Morris International
Law Essay Contest.
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religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal whether or not in violation of
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
The question of whether these were crimes recognizable in international
law and punishable by international tribunals was a very real and significant one, for the Allies based their right to try the defendants not on the
recent military victory but on existing principles of international law. This
claim gave rise to criticism by friend and foe alike which had continued to
the present. Some of the primary points made by critics were that the
defendants were doomed anyway and the trial was merely a charade; that
the court could not be fair because it was not neutral; that hearsay evidence was admitted; that defendants were being tried under ex post facto
laws; and that defendants should be free from liability because they acted
under superior orders. Of these points, the last two are probably the most
significant and have produced the most controversy.
A primary contention of the defendants was that they were being tried
under laws which were not in existence at the time their alleged crimes
were committed. They contended that their captors were violating the legal
maxim, "No punishment without a penal law in force at the time of the
3
commission of the act."
Beginning with statements of prosecutors at Nuremberg and continuing
until today the theory has been advanced that, whether or not defendants are being tried by laws not previously in existence, the ex post facto
defense is not available to them. The reason for prohibiting retroactive
laws is to protect one who acted believing in good faith that the law did not
prohibit his particular act. It is difficult to comprehend how the defendants
could have believed that their acts were lawful, although persons who
would commit such crimes might well have such a distorted sense of values
as to believe completely that what they did was justified as an act of state
and therefore lawful.
The point is also made that the ex post facto doctrine is a general legal
principle, not a limitation on sovereignty and that therefore each system of
justice may allow or reject use of the concept. Some legal systems do not
recognize the concept.
Despite contention against the applicability of the doctrine, the Allies
and later defenders of the trial went to great lengths to show that retroactive laws were not being applied at Nuremberg. The two most significant
aspects of the ex post facto controversy concern aggressive war as a crime
and applicability of international law to individuals.
3

Nuremberg: German Views of the War Trials 29 (Benton and Grimm, eds. 1955).
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Defendants argued strenuously that wars of aggression, which Count 2
of the indictment charges them with carrying out, did not constitute a crime
in international law. Just as strenuously the Allies sought to show that,
through such things as treaties, protocols and writings of respected legal
scholars, international law had grown to include the concept of the illegality of aggressive war. International law, like the common law, has grown
and expanded over time.
Both sides agreed that prior to World War I nations accepted the right of
other nations to engage in aggressive war. However, the Allies insist that
after 1918 world leaders attempted to make aggressive war a lawless act.
For example, in 1923, in a Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the League
of Nations stated that "aggressive war is an international crime." 4 The
Geneva Protocol of 1924 branded aggressive war as a crime. 5 The League
acted again in 1927, adopting the Declaration Concerning Wars of Aggression, declaring such wars to be international crimes. 6 A similar resolution
was adopted by 21 American Republics in 1928. 7 Also in 1928 came the
document most relied upon by the Tribunal to show that wars of aggression
are condemned by mankind as violations of international law - the Treaty
for the Renunciation of War, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, by which 64 nations,
including Germany, pledged to renounce war as an instrument of national
policy. 8 This pact did not expressly outlaw aggressive war, but it has been
widely interpreted as doing so by implication. Unfortunately, it was notably ineffective in preventing nations from proceeding with whatever military action suited their purpose at the time. In spite of its failures, supporters of the Nuremberg trials look to it as the capstone of a large body of
international law which grew up after World War I and branded wars of
aggression as criminal.
The other side is not without its valid arguments, the most significant of
which being that acts of aggression taking place since promulgation of all
the documents mentioned above have not been denounced as crimes and
the leaders of the aggressor nations have not been threatened with personal
liability for the acts of their countries. Although Japan's invasion of China
and Italy's conquest of Abyssinia are cited, most of the criticism, to the
embarrassment of the Great Powers, falls on a member of the Tribunal
itself, the USSR. In 1948, Dr. Hans Ehard, then Minister - President of
Bavaria, pointed out that no cry had been raised to punish Russian leaders
4

Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Peace, 34 Fordham L. Rev. 1, at 3 (1945).
5Glueck,
The Nurnberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 Hrv. L. Rev. 396, at 409 (1946).
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for her invasion of Finland in 1939, for which act of aggression Russia was
expelled from the League of Nations. Nor did Russia, when it was informed in advance of Germany's planned invasion of Poland, condemn the
invasion as a crime against international law.9
The stronger argument seems to be that civilized nations did intend to
recognize aggressive war as a crime against international law. Whether
they intended that punishment for such crime should go beyond public
condemnation of, and economic sanctions against, the aggressor nation is
quite another question. Here we encounter defendants' contention that
international law operates on nations rather than on individuals. This
contention, if accepted, would relieve defendants of liability for the war
crimes and crimes against humanity charged to them as well as the crime of
conducting a war of aggression.
Most Nuremberg critics do not attempt to deny that war crimes, as
charged in Count 3 of the indictment, are illegal. They further accept the
theory that punishment may be imposed for crimes against humanity
(Count 4) insofar as they are connected with war crimes -and the Tribunal
considered crimes against humanity only when they were connected with a
crime of war or of aggression; crimes against humanity committed before
September 1, 1939, were outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 10 Defendants' freedom from responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity rests solely on their contention of the inapplicability of international law
to individuals.
Professor Oppenheim, a leading authority in international law, contended that, since international law is based on consent of states, it operates only upon states and not individuals." An 18th century German
scholar, Christian Von Wolff, felt that one who wages unjust war is a
robber and a bandit but that his acts in such a war are chargeable only to
the nation as a whole, not to the individual committing them. 12 Other
authorities agree that the sovereignty of nations prevents application of
international law to individuals. According to this school of thought, the
defendant at Nuremberg should be Germany, not her leaders.
The argument for application of international law to individuals seems
quite strong. As early as the 16th century it was recommended that the
Pope act as a judge of sovereigns who violated the laws of nations in
conducting wars.13 The Oxford Manual of Land Warfare, 1800, states that
9

Benton and Grimm, eds., op. cit. note 3, at 96, 97.
" Renter, Nurnberg 1946-The Trial, 23 Notre Dame Law. 76, at 86, 87 (1947).
1
Goodhart, The Legality of the Nuremberg Trials, 58 Jurid. Rev. 1, at 8 (1946).
12 Benton and Crimm, eds., op. cit. note 3, at 19.
"3Lauer, The International War Criminal Trials and the Common Law of War, 20 St.
John's L. Rev. 18 (1944).
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acts done in violation of the principles of civilized warfare are criminal, and
14
offending parties may be tried by the belligerent in whose hands they are.
In 1901, a United States military commission tried, convicted and sentenced to death a Philippine insurgent officer for robbing and killing Spanish prisoners of war. This officer was tried under international law rather
15
than under United States, Spanish or Philippine law.
The Germans themselves, by the Treaty of Peace after World War I,
recognized the Allies' right to try persons accused of violating the laws and
customs of war. Ultimately it was the Germans who tried their alleged war
criminals. Of twelve who were tried, six were convicted. 16 This was not a
tremendous achievement since the Allies had presented Germany with
some 900 names to be tried, but it does indicate acceptance of the theory
that international law does indeed operate on individuals. After all, crimes
and acts of war are committed by individuals and not be states. The fact
that the individual acts for the state does not relieve him of responsibility,
unless perhaps by the defense of superior order, which is another primary
point raised by the defendants at Nuremberg.
Government officials and members of the military services are under a
duty, particularly in time of war, to obey the directions and orders of their
superiors. This being so, the question naturally arises as to whether a
subordinate can be held personally responsible for carrying out orders. If
obedience to superior order is an absolute defense, probably none of the
Nuremberg defendants would have been convicted since virtually all orders in Nazi Germany originated with Hitler.
Professor Oppenheim says that "the law cannot require an individual to
be punished for an act which he was compelled by law to commit."' 1 7 The
United States Rules of Land Warfare, 1940, provided that members of the
armed forces shall not be punished for offenses committed under order or
sanction of superior authority. 18 The British Manual of Military Law formerly allowed the defense of superior order to protect a soldier from
punishment for acts of war. In 1944 the manual was changed to permit the
defense of lawful superior order.' 9 This change seems in harmony with the
majority view of the defense of superior order that only lawful orders offer
an absolute defense. If the order is unlawful the subordinate is protected
14

Sack, Punishment of War Criminals and the Defense of Superior Order, 60 L. Q. Rev.
63, at 565 (1944).
1 Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33 Calif. L. Rev. 177, at 211
(1945).
16 Lauer, op. cit. note 13, at 20.
17Sack, op. cit. note 14, at 67.
18
lbid at 66.
19
Rowson, Punishment of War Criminals, 60 L. Q. Rev. 225, at 226 (1944).
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only to the extent that the court may consider the fact of the order and the
surrounding circumstances in mitigation of the act.
History shows many instances of domestic and international courts
facing the question of defense of superior order. In two United States cases
where military guards killed escaping prisoners, the court held that the
defense of superior order is acceptable only if the order would appear to a
man of ordinary sense and understanding as lawful on its face and within
the scope of the superior officer's authority. 20 In Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S.
594 (1878), a Confederate soldier was found not liable for burning
plaintiff's cotton to prevent its falling into Federal hands since he acted
under authority of a lawful order. One not as fortunate was Henry Wirz,
commander of the Confederate prison at Andersonville, Georgia. In 1865
he was tried by a United States military commission for cruelties to
Federal prisoners and murder in violation of the laws and customs of war.
His defense of superior order was rejected, and he was convicted and
21
hanged.
German recognition of the superior order doctrine as accepted by the
majority of international legal authorities was demonstrated at the 1921
Leipzig trials of World War I war criminals. In one significant case, Lt.
Karl Neumann, a German submarine commander, was tried for sinking a
British hospital ship, the Dover Castle. At one time during World War I
the German government believed that the British were using hospital ships
in the Mediterranean for military purposes in violation of international law.
The Germans notified the British that all hospital ships leaving Greece
must give advance notice of their departure and follow a prescribed route:
otherwise they would be sunk. In view of these circumstances, Lt. Neumann believed that the sinking of the Dover Castle which had been ordered by the German Admiralty, was a legitimate reprisal. The court found
22
that this belief was justified and acquitted him.
In another of the war crimes cases the court applied the doctrine of
unlawful order being no excuse. Two submarine officers, Lt. Dithmar and
Lt. Boldt, under orders from their commanding officer, participated in the
machine-gunning of survivors of the torpedoed British hospital ship Llandovery Castle. The court stated that a subordinate would be held responsible only if he knew the order was unlawful. Although the court further
said that a case where a subordinate knew this would be extremely unusual, it found that this was such a case and convicted Dithmar and Boldt.2 3
20in re Fair, 100 Fed. 149 (1900); United States v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710 (1887).
21

Sack, op. cit. note 14, at 65.
Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law With Particular
Regard
23 to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 530, at 558, 559 (1943).
ibid at 559.
22
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It is apparently recognized in international law that a person under
military or government orders usually cannot thoroughly analyze an order
given him to determine its legality. The proper criterion for judging the
individual's action is set out by the German court in the Llandovery Castle
decision: "the order does not free the accused of guilt if such an order is
universally known to be against the law." '24 It has been generally held that
danger to the subordinate's life incurred by refusal to obey an obviously
25
illegal order does not excuse his conduct.
Such a circumstance would doubtless evoke the sympathy of a court for
most defendants. Not so with the Nuremberg defendants, however. There
is no indication that they felt they were being forced to act against their
will. They seemed quite content taking and giving orders to carry out
Hitler's plan of world conquest. Thus their defense of superior order
somehow rings hollow.
On October 1, 1946, the trial was concluded, almost one year after its
beginning. Rightly or wrongly the Tribunal had written a new chapter in
international law and in the course of so doing, had decided the fate of 22
of Nazi Germany's highest officials: three were acquitted and seven sentenced to prison terms ranging from 10 years for Admiral Karl Doenitz to
life for 3 defendants including Rudolf Hess, the Fuehrer's First Deputy
and said by many to be mad. Twelve were sentenced to death. 26 Hermann
Goering, of course, cheated the hangman by committing suicide, and Martin Bormann, tried in absentia, was not found so only ten were hanged by
the Allies. For them the swirling controversy of Nuremberg and its legality
no longer mattered. The fact of death obscured the legal ramifications with
which the world still struggles.
There has been no serious objection raised to the right of the Allies, by
right of conquest, to do what they wished to the German nation and her
leaders. It was when the victors forsook their right to deal with the
defeated foe by summary judgement that a multitude of legal and political
problems were encountered.
The issues discussed here are by no means all those raised during or
after the trial, but are among the most significant. It is doubtful that a
consensus of opinion could be reached on even the limited issues raised
here. However, some conclusions may be offered.
1) Prior to Nuremberg the civilized world looked upon aggressive war as
a crime, but one punishable by economic and political *sanctions
against the nation, not individual punishment of the nation's leaders.
24

Sack, op. cit. note 14, at 67.
25Ibid
at 64.
2
0Leventhal et. al., The Nurnberg Verdict, 6 Hrv. L. Rev. 857, at 907 (1947).
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2) A country's leaders could not be punished under existing international
law for crimes against their own people within their own country
unless such crimes were associated with war crimes (the Tribunal
apparently recognized this although the indictment might be interpreted otherwise).
3) Those leaders could be punished as individuals for war crimes and
crimes against humanity associated with their war crimes.
4) Defense of superior order is no bar to punishment of an individual
when the order is obviously unlawful on its face.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the course the Allies took in
dispensing justice after the war, it is evident that an attempt was made to
substitute law and due process for vengence and summary execution. For
this at least we may be grateful.
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